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Predispositions and orientation toward cooperation 
or competition with other jurisdictions can play a 
critical role in implementing regional collaboration. 
By examining collaboration at the micro level, this 
article investigates how individual factors, including 
perceptions of cooperation and competition, as well as 
institutional and environmental factors, are related to 
regional collaboration. In particular, the authors assert 
that competitive motivation may support the emergence 
of regional governance mechanisms. Th is article explores 
the relationships between competitive/cooperative 
motivations and interlocal collaboration networks based 
on a network survey conducted in the Orlando, Florida, 
metropolitan area. Th e authors apply a quadratic 
assignment procedure regression analysis to examine how 
dyadic conceptual ties of cooperation and competition, 
along with the eff ect of community characteristics, aff ect 
policy network structures for economic development. 
By comparing estimated coeffi  cients with sampling 
distributions of coeffi  cients from all of the permuted 
data sets, the regression results indicate the infl uences 
of perceived competition/cooperation on the network 
exchange.
The local economic development policy arena often is described as highly competitive because local governments often pursue their 
individual opportunities to 
promote business and expand 
their own jurisdiction’s tax 
base. Economic development is 
primarily a local responsibility, 
with assistance from state and 
federal agencies (Gordon 2007; 
Peterson 1981). Th e inherently 
competitive nature of local gov-
ernment development agendas, 
in combination with jurisdictional fragmentation, 
produces complexity and uncertainty for potential 
coordination and collaboration eff orts. However, posi-
tive and negative intergovernmental externalities that 
result from economic development create demands for 
more integrated solutions.
Collaborative eff orts can address important issues 
such as economies of scale, spillovers, urban sprawl, 
environmental impacts, income disparity, duplication 
of policies and services, and so on (Feiock 2002; Fleis-
chmann 2000; Goetz and Kayser 1993). In fact, over 
several decades, local governments in many regions of 
the United States have established various types of col-
laborative development strategies that take a regional 
approach to policy formation and implementation 
in order to enhance their regional economic develop-
ment. In other words, some communities operate as 
boundary spanners by promoting economic develop-
ment through horizontal as well as vertical collabora-
tion (Agranoff  and McGuire 2003).
Regional governance strategies, however, can be 
employed successfully only when competitive percep-
tions and motivations are overcome (Gordon 2007). 
Collaborative eff orts among local governments may be 
hampered by their desires to maintain local autonomy, 
distrust among local jurisdictions, confl icting interests 
among potential participants, or an imbalance in pow-
ers and resource endowments (Visser 2002). On the 
other hand, even among fi erce competitors, there is 
pressure for local jurisdictions not to be isolated from 
various types of potential collaborative activities that 
might bestow signifi cant advantages. Th is suggests 
that diverse values and percep-
tions about other jurisdictions 
can shape interlocal behaviors 
among communities and, thus, 
the overall confi guration of 
regional governance systems.
Interlocal collaboration occurs 
when two or more local govern-
ments seek to accomplish a 
desirable outcome through coordination or coopera-
tion. Collective action begins with the recognition of 
interdependency among local governments in which 
a decision or action of one government aff ects the 
actions of others. Th is strategic interaction among 
actors becomes more complicated and uncertain as the 
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 Olberding 2002). Institutional arrangements play an important role 
in making collaboration attractive by providing specifi c rules about 
how the negotiation and bargaining process for collective outcomes 
should be organized, how diff erent incidences and responsibilities 
should be allocated among participants, and how agreed-upon rules 
will be implemented and enforced (Steinacker 2004). In this sense, 
regional governance can be recognized as resolving collective action 
problems; setting constraints that help participating governments 
avoid the negative eff ects of collective actions such as diseconomies 
of scale, urban sprawl, environmental impact, income disparity, 
and duplication of policies; enabling local governments to interact 
collectively to create benefi cial outcomes; and reconciling rationality 
at the individual level with rationality at the collective level (Andrew 
2009).
One virtue of various regional governance mechanisms is that they 
allow participating actors to achieve their common goals in a self-
organizing manner. It usually requires negotiation to reach consen-
sus, and this process, in turn, provides an opportunity to develop 
trust and reciprocal arrangements among members that is critical 
for reducing the costs of reaching and maintaining an agreement. 
We refer to the patterns of informal relationships that preserve full 
local autonomy and require no formal authority as “informal policy 
networks.” Th ese relationships, which are 
embedded in socioeconomic and political 
relationships, can provide critical support for 
monitoring, enforcement, and compliance 
with the self-developed institutional rules 
that impose constraints on the autonomy of 
participants (Feiock and Scholz 2010; Schnei-
der et al. 2003). Th e process of creating and 
amending their own rules generates greater 
legitimacy among participants, who can 
design levels of fl exibility and enforcement 
that are appropriate for the concerns of the 
participants. One successful self-organizing ef-
fort can cultivate mutual reciprocity, trust, and collaborative norms 
in the regional arena (Feiock et al. 2010). Th is process, in turn, 
increases the likelihood of further eff orts that can resolve other types 
of regional problems.
Collaborative networks are an outcome of purposive activities 
to forge relationships in order to solve problems by creating or 
discovering solutions within a given set of constraints, including 
knowledge, time, resources, and even competition (Agranoff  and 
McGuire 2003; Schrage 1995). For example, from their case studies, 
Agranoff  and McGuire (2003) found that collaborative economic 
development networks emerge as a dominant process of facilitating 
and operating in multiorganizational arrangements to solve prob-
lems that cannot be solved, or solved easily, by single organizations. 
Th rough this process, multiple governmental and nongovernmental 
entities jointly steer courses of action and generate policy outcomes 
that enhance the overall welfare of their communities (Agranoff  and 
McGuire 2003). In fact, this collaborative network has been proven 
to play a signifi cant role in improving individual policy outcomes 
by mitigating collective action problems as well as capturing a 
greater advantage from collaborative problem solving (Agranoff  and 
McGuire 2003; Lubell et al. 2002; Meier and O’Toole 2002; Provan 
and Milward 2001).
number of local jurisdictions increases, particularly in metropolitan 
areas. Collective action problems occur when local governments, 
which are attempting to maximize their own welfare, do not pursue 
collective benefi ts for the entire region, which eventually leads to an 
inferior outcome (Feiock and Scholz 2010).
Th e alternative governance mechanisms that are available to local 
government units include centralized authority, mutually bind-
ing contracts or agreements, and network embeddedness (Fei-
ock 2004, 2009). Th is research generally focuses on the role of 
network embeddedness, which is the most pervasive but the least 
understood of these mechanisms. By relying on social, economic, 
and political relationships rather than formal authority, network 
embeddedness off ers fl exibility for rules, procedures, and ex-
changes to be decided locally while preserving the autonomy of 
the actors involved.
Economic development is an ideal policy arena for examining how 
the perceptions and motivations of local offi  cials ultimately deter-
mine overall patterns of collaborative arrangements. Th e dilemma 
for local actors working on economic development is that coopera-
tion with other jurisdictions provides tremendous potential benefi ts 
once it turns out to be successful, but it also poses greater risks than 
cooperation in most other areas (Lee, Feiock, 
and Park 2011). Th is suggests that local 
government leaders’ predispositions and ori-
entation toward cooperation or competition 
with other jurisdictions play critical roles in 
implementing regional collaborative arrange-
ments. However, extant research in public ad-
ministration pays little attention to how local 
leaders’ perceptions of competitive or collabo-
rative environments relate to their interlocal 
policy network relationships. In contrast, this 
article provides a micro-level examination of 
how individual factors, including perceptions 
of cooperation and competition, as well as institutional and envi-
ronmental factors are related to regional collaboration.
Th e literatures on interlocal policy networks tend to focus exclusive-
ly on cooperation as a motivation for informal policy networks, and 
thus they fail to systematically capture how competitive as well as 
cooperative environments might foster the creation of regional gov-
ernance mechanisms. Th is article explores the relationships between 
competitive/cooperative motivations and policy communication 
through informal policy networks among local governments using 
a network survey conducted in the Orlando, Florida, metropoli-
tan area. Th e construction of dyadic data on the local government 
relationships allows us to investigate how competitive and coopera-
tive development environments infl uence the structure of informal 
policy networks.
Informal Policy Networks as a Regional Governance 
Mechanism
While decentralized decision making can generate collaborative 
regional solutions, it also might lead to noncooperation and destruc-
tive competition for development. In this sense, these collaborative 
regional eff orts can be implemented successfully only if competi-
tive perceptions and motivations are overcome (Gordon 2007; 
[T]his article provides a micro-
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institutional and environmental 
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and Park 2011; Steinacker 2004), the cost of being left behind will 
exceed the loss of not sharing information with their competitors. 
Being isolated from various ongoing activities among neighboring 
jurisdictions might place local offi  cials in a politically risky position, 
especially when citizens expect them to produce tangible outcomes. 
In the context of economic development, local offi  cials can benefi t 
from collecting information, benchmarking, and participating in 
joint activities that are visible to local citizens. Th is suggests that no 
matter what motivations are involved, either admiration or political 
risk aversion, forging informal relationships with other competi-
tive actors to share and gather information is a critical element of 
managing local economic development.
Moving from the competitive to the cooperative policy environ-
ment, we fi nd that generating formal or informal links with 
potential partners is even more important. Repeated interactions in 
one or more policy arenas are manifestations of networked relation-
ships that help control uncertainties and overcome collective action 
problems (Granovetter 1985; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Lubell 
et al. 2002). Because information about actors, especially regard-
ing previous decisions and behaviors, is relatively open to network 
participants, economic development policy network structure 
reduces the possibility of breaking the trust that has been established 
among participants. In addition, the structure 
provides an extensive monitoring mecha-
nism and facilitates mutual reciprocity, trust, 
and conformance to the rules of the game 
(Coleman 1988). Th erefore, consideration of 
reputation, communication, trust, and social 
norms imposes constraints on defection and 
opportunism that increase the stability of a 
regional governance structure (Feiock, Stein-
acker, and Park 2009).
Moreover, networked relationships help 
resolve many issues with regard to arranging the details of collabora-
tive eff orts among cooperative partners. In other words, diff erences 
in demands and resource endowments, imbalances in power, and 
disagreements resulting from confl icting interests among partici-
pants can be lessened through an environment that is conducive 
to cooperation, which eventually mitigates the inevitable problems 
of collective action among potential partners (Fleischmann 2000; 
Visser 2002). Th erefore, network embeddedness mitigates distrust 
in competitive environments, and it also counters negative predis-
positions to enhance local offi  cials’ willingness to learn and teach, 
thus allowing for future cooperation on other policy issue arenas. In 
addition, where there is more trust, there is less need to constantly 
monitor compliance (Alter and Hage 1993). In the long run, these 
positive aspects of cooperative environments fortify network embed-
dedness among members. In this sense, social capital is a critical 
factor for economic development at any level that helps formulate 
new strategies for growth and development (Garcia 2006). Social 
capital fostered by local interactions through network embeddedness 
encourages commitments and reinforces a norm of reciprocity that 
facilitates regional cooperation (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1995).
Th erefore, perceptions about other communities and policy net-
works generally make local governments willing to forge relation-
ships not only with their cooperative partners, but also with existing 
Network Embeddedness and Perceptions toward 
Competition and Cooperation
Policy networks are one of several alternative governance mecha-
nisms for regional economic development. Like other regional 
institutions, networks reduce transaction costs and uncertainty by 
defi ning and regulating participants’ behaviors and expectations. 
On the other hand, unlike less adaptive and more formal alterna-
tives, network embeddedness relies more on voluntary agreements 
among local units that are coordinated and enforced through social, 
economic, and political relationships rather than authority (Feiock 
2009).
In this sense, self-organizing policy networks off er several potential 
advantages over more formal solutions. By allowing more local 
autonomy, network embeddedness helps local units overcome 
 individual governments’ reluctance to delegate their autonomy to 
newly established arrangements and minimizes political confl icts 
involved in revoking existing authority from local governments. 
By generally requiring the consent of all members, self-governing 
institutions enhance the search for a mutually advantageous 
resolution of collective action dilemma, and they reduce potential 
confl icts involved when majorities can impose solutions on un-
willing minorities (Feiock et al. 2010). Because they emerge from 
planned and unplanned interactions among 
local actors, policy network structures ensure 
suffi  cient fl exibility for rules, procedures, and 
exchanges to be decided locally. Th erefore, the 
perceptions and motivations of local actors 
toward collaborative eff orts play an especially 
important role in establishing and maintain-
ing network interactions with neighboring 
jurisdictions.
How, then, do local governments perceive 
other government units in relation to their 
economic development, especially in terms of competition or 
cooperation? Goetz and Kayser (1993) found that 85 percent of 
municipalities surveyed in the Twin Cities in Minnesota felt that 
competition exists, but only half of them viewed this competition 
as benefi cial. Although this dilemma may be solved by collectively 
adopting regional economic development strategies, such eff orts of-
ten are destined to fail because of unequal needs, unequal resources, 
and inequities in power and accountability (Nice 1987). In this 
regard, critics believe that interlocal competition is a permanent 
feature of metropolitan regions. However, interlocal competition 
also may foster mutual admiration and respect among competitors 
(Gordon 2007), and it even may produce a willingness to learn from 
each other (Smith and Beazley 2000). In addition to being compe-
tent and aware of how and where to obtain needed resources, local 
governments are required to take great care not to exploit or betray 
purpose and to demonstrate respect and fairness to their collabora-
tive partners (Ferguson and Stoutland 1999). Th erefore, diff erences 
may be lessened out of mutual understanding, which, in turn, miti-
gates the inevitable problems of collective actions such as distrust, 
confl icting interests, and unequal powers among potential partners.
In addition to mutual admiration, there are strategic incentives 
for local jurisdictions to keep track of their competitors’ activi-
ties. When local offi  cials are politically risk averse (Lee, Feiock, 
No matter what motivations are 
involved, either admiration or 
political risk aversion, forging 
informal relationships with 
other competitive actors to 
share and gather information is 
a critical element of managing 
local economic development.
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among potential partners. Cooperative strategies address perceived 
obstacles to collaboration and the implementation of collaborative 
strategies once they are agreed upon by each of the governments 
involved.
H3 (theory of homophily): Actors who share similar socio-
economic attributes and political institutions are more likely 
to create linkages with each other because they are more likely 
to share similar economic development agendas and policy 
preferences, which reduces information costs and predisposes 
actors to cooperate.
Data and Methods
To test the relationship between predispositions and orientations 
toward competition/cooperation and the emergence of policy 
networks for economic development, we employ quadratic as-
signment procedure (QAP) analysis. We examine how the per-
ceptions of competitive or collaborative relationships with other 
governments infl uence the tendency to establish informal policy 
communication networks in the area of economic development. 
Th is section describes the data and methods used to address this 
research question.
First, based on the dyadic information collected on each category 
of perceptions and informal networks, the QAP correlation analysis 
is employed to investigate the simple correlation between com-
petition/cooperation matrices and the policy network matrix (see 
table 1). Second, the QAP regression analysis examines how the two 
contrasting motivations, along with similarities or diff erences in 
some community attributes, aff ect the structures of policy networks 
for economic development (see table 2). While interpretations and 
implications of these analyses may be very similar to a traditional 
statistical approach, the major diff erence is that the QAP analyses 
deal with a series of dyadic data in which observations are more 
likely to be interdependent. Th e QAP techniques allow us to control 
for interdependencies that are common in social network data.1
While there are limitations when surveying organizations in a single 
metropolitan area, this method has the advantage of allowing us to 
control for state and regional variations. Th e Kissimmee–Orlando 
competitors. However, their underlying motivations to form 
linkages will diff er: competitive motivations, along with mutual rec-
ognition of competitors’ strengths and abilities, lead to a desire to be 
informed about what other jurisdictions are pursuing and to utilize 
potential opportunities to collect information, benchmark, and par-
ticipate in some collaborative eff orts in order to be less isolated. In 
contrast, the motivations for cooperation tend to create links with 
others in order to address perceived obstacles to collaboration and 
implement collaborative strategies once they are agreed upon.
Hypotheses
We expect that local governments are willing to forge relationships 
not only with their potential cooperative partners, but also with 
their eminent competitors, and that their underlying motivations to 
forge policy networks will be diff erent. (see Figure 1)
H1 (perceived competition and policy networks): In highly 
competitive environments, in which a local government’s 
development strategies are designed to be competitive, there 
is a tendency for the local offi  cials to establish linkages with 
their competitors.
As a local government recognizes its competition to be tougher, the 
more likely it is to forge a cooperative link with the competitor, 
while at the same time continuing to compete. Th e motivation for 
joint eff orts is driven by the local offi  cials’ desires to have informa-
tion about what other jurisdictions are pursuing and to avoid being 
isolated from other potential opportunities from collaborative 
eff orts. Th is motivation sometimes is fortifi ed by mutual admiration 
and respect and even a willingness to learn from their most eminent 
competitors.
H2 (perceived cooperation and policy networks): In a more 
cooperative environment, in which a local government’s 
strategies are designed to be more cooperative with other ju-
risdictions, there is a tendency for the local offi  cial to establish 
linkages with potential cooperators.
Th e motivation is driven by the need to mitigate the inevitable 
problems of collective action and to facilitate collaborative eff orts 
Figure 1 Relationship between Perceptions and Policy Networks
Network Ties 
Government A Government B
-
: Between Similar Actors
: Between Dissimilar Actors 
Government C Government D
Network Ties 
+
: Network Activity Dimension 
Network Ties
Competition
Government A Government B 
+
: Perception Dimension 
Network Ties 
Government A Government B 
+
: Perception Dimension 
: Network Activity Dimension 
Cooperation
(a) Perceived Competition and Policy Networks (b) Perceived Cooperation and Policy Networks
(c) Theory of Homophily
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annual or more frequent (e.g., monthly, weekly, or daily) contact.4 
Although network contacts can occur on several diff erent dimen-
sions (e.g., discussion, information sharing, advice), we asked 
respondents to report a more general aspect of network contacts. 
Th us, we were able to collect information on the level of network 
activities in a single dimension (informal communication net-
work).
Th e information gathered was used to construct three separate 
matrices capturing both perceptions of local offi  cials toward policy 
competition/cooperation and the existence of informal networks 
for economic development. Consistent with the network analysis, 
we converted our data into a 31 x 31 matrix. For the perception 
matrices (competition/cooperation), we kept the original scale of 
measure (0–4); however, the network contact matrix was collapsed 
to a binary variable that was coded 0 if there was no interaction and 
1 if there was annual or more frequent interaction. In other words, 
only 0 (no interaction) was coded as 0, and all other responses (1–5, 
ranging from annual interaction to daily interaction) were coded 
as 1.5 Based on these criteria, we translated the network contact 
information into an adjacency matrix of links for each of the 
 participating actors, where 1 represents existing interactions and 0 
denotes the absence of interaction. Because the values in the matrix 
refl ect each government’s evaluation of the relationship between 
two governments with respect to either perceptions or activity, the 
adjacency matrices are asymmetrical in their structure. Th is opera-
tion allows us to investigate the correlations across three separate 
matrices in the later analyses.
We also include the characteristics of communities in the QAP 
multiple regression analysis in order to test whether similarities 
or diff erences between two actors increase network links between 
them. Th ese include socioeconomic attributes (e.g., population size, 
median household income, ratio of non-Hispanic white popula-
tion), political institutions (e.g., whether municipalities belong to 
same the county and whether they maintain the same local form 
of government), and geographic proximity. Th e data on actor at-
tributes were collected from the archival source of the local jurisdic-
tion in the Kissimmee–Orlando metropolitan area. Th en, the data 
for each variable were constructed in separate matrices in which 
each cell in the matrix represents the diff erence between two match-
ing governments. For example, if government A has 100,000 resi-
dents and government B has 60,000 residents, the row A of column 
B has a value of 40,000. For the binary and categorical variable, we 
assign 1 if both governments belong to the same categories and 0 
otherwise. For instance, if government C belongs to Orange County 
and government D is in Seminole County, row C of column D has 
a value of 0.
Quadratic Assignment Procedure Analysis
To investigate the extent to which each motivation—competitive or 
cooperative—is associated with the probability of informal policy 
networks being formed, we fi rst utilized the matrix correlation 
analysis in the UCINET program. Th e analysis employs quadratic 
assignment procedures analysis to identify the degree of associa-
tion between matrices and develop standard errors to test for its 
signifi cance (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). By performing random 
permutation (simulation) on the rows and columns of the two 
matrices, QAP estimates the measure of association when there is no 
metropolitan area was selected because it is one of the fastest- 
growing urban regions in the United States and has a highly frag-
mented system of general-purpose local governments. Th e local gov-
ernments in the metropolitan area demonstrate substantial variance 
in their size and other socioeconomic attributes. While localities 
tend to pursue their own strategies for development (e.g., provid-
ing tax incentives and issuing development bonds within their own 
jurisdictions), they also have a history of collaborative eff orts (e.g., 
marketing and promoting their localities, joint operation of business 
assistance programs, establishing joint ventures or partnerships, and 
developing joint strategic planning).
Th e network setting consists of 27 cities and four counties in the 
Kissimmee–Orlando metropolitan area. A total of 38 city and 
county governments in the four-county (Lake, Orange, Osceola, 
and Seminole) metropolitan area were surveyed in 2006–2007, and 
81.5 percent of the jurisdictions responded to our surveys (31 out 
of 38).
Th e survey asked key respondents—mostly city managers or the top 
economic development offi  cials—in each of these governments to 
report on several issues: (1) the extent to which the development 
strategies of a responding local government refl ect competition with 
each of the governments listed in the survey instrument (competi-
tion matrix),2 (2) the extent to which the development strategies of 
a responding local government refl ect cooperation with each of the 
governments listed in the survey instrument (cooperation matrix),3 
and (3) which governments a responding local government had 
interacted with (including discussion, advice, and information shar-
ing) on economic development issues in the previous year (informal 
network matrix) and how often. Th e specifi c questions in both the 
competition and cooperation matrices were designed to measure the 
intensity of the predisposition of competition or cooperation toward 
other specifi c local governments. Th e ordinal scale ranges from 0 
(not at all) to 4 (great extent).
Th e informal policy communication network matrix is based on 
a question that asked the frequency of contacts among pairs of 
actors and collapsed the frequency into a dichotomous variable 
that was coded 0 if there was no interaction and 1 if there was 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics: Dyads between Local Governments on Each 
Dimension (Policy Networks, Competition, and Cooperation)
Policy 
 Networks Competition Cooperation
Dyadic counts 465 Dyadic counts 465 465 
Mutual 42 Mutual 13 23 
Asymmetric 108 Asymmetric 122 138 
Null 315 Null 330 304 
Network density 0.2065 Matrix density 0.356 0.490 
Average degree 6. 1935 Average strength 4.774 5.936
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics: Actor Attributes: Total of 31 Local Governments 
Min Max Mean
Population 19 1,043,500 87,296
Median income 25,988 88,809 44,298
Race (Non-Hispanic white ratio) 43.7 95.7 72
County 0 3 1.16
Form of government 0 1 0.81
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cooperation matrix and the informal policy network. Th e estimated 
measures of association are reported in tables 3 and 4. Th e second 
columns in tables 3 and 4 report the values of each measure for the 
correlation. Because one of the matrices for comparison includes 
binary data (policy networks) and the other is in an ordinal scale 
(competition/cooperation matrix), we pay special attention to the 
interpretation of the values for simple matching and the Goodman-
Kruskal gamma (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).8 “Signifi cance” in 
the third columns in tables 3 and 4 tests the signifi cance of the val-
ues in column 2 based on standard errors. In addition, “average” in 
the fourth columns shows the average value of the correlation across 
a large number of random trials generated by random QAP process 
(Shrestha and Feiock 2009). In other words, whereas the second col-
umn measures a correlation based on observed simple matching, the 
fourth column shows a correlation from randomly selected match-
ing. Th e fi fth column reports a standard deviation of the distribu-
tion of the measures for a correlation across the random trials.
Simple matching coeffi  cients in tables 3 and 4 are 0.724 (perceived 
competition versus informal networks) and 0.735 (perceived co-
operation versus informal networks), respectively. And these values 
are statistically signifi cant. In other words, when there is a competi-
tive perception between two local governments, there is about a 
72  percent chance that this motivation leads to an informal network 
connection (represented by 1 in the policy network matrix). Like-
wise, if there is a cooperative perception between two local govern-
ments, there is about a 74 percent chance that a network linkage 
emerges between the two.
Similarly, the values for the Goodman-Kruskal gamma reported in 
tables 3 and 4 show how the intensity of those perceptions is related 
to the likelihood of a network linkage being present.9 For example, 
the Goodman-Kruskal gamma (0.689) is smaller than the simple 
matching coeffi  cients (0.724) in table 3. Th is suggests that although 
perceived competition is associated closely with the presence of 
network contacts, there might be a negative relationship between 
intense competition and participation in informal networks for eco-
nomic development. To the contrary, the Goodman-Kruskal gamma 
(0.885) is greater than the simple matching coeffi  cients (0.735) in 
table 4, which implies that there is a positive association between 
Table 3 QAP Matrix Correlation (Perceived Competition versus Policy Networks)
Statistics Value Signifi cance Average Std. Dev.
Pearson correlation 0.213** 0.027 –0.001 0.090 
Simple matching 0.724** 0.006 0.675 0.021 
Jaccard coeffi cient 0.273** 0.002 0.100 0.044
Goodman-Kruskal gamma 0.689** 0.002 –0.034 0.282 
Hamming distance 257.000** 0.006 301.531 16.544 
Notes: A total of 2500 times of permutations are conducted; Hubert’s gamma in 
this analysis is 142.000.
Table 4 QAP Matrix Correlation (Perceived Cooperation versus Policy Networks)
Statistics Value Signifi cance Average Std. Dev.
Pearson correlation 0.560*** 0.000 –0.003 0.081
Simple matching 0.735*** 0.000 0.643 0.023
Jaccard coeffi cient 0.461*** 0.000 0.114 0.043
Goodman-Kruskal gamma 0.885*** 0.000 –0.032 0.257
Hamming distance 244.000*** 0.000 328.578 18.862
Notes: A total of 2500 times of permutations are conducted; Hubert’s gamma in 
this analysis is 319.000.
systematic connection between the two relations. In doing so, the 
QAP analysis takes into account the assumption of  independency 
of observations in standard bivariate and multivariate analyses 
(Shrestha and Feiock 2009).6 Th is QAP correlation analysis simply 
investigates correlation between competition/cooperation matrices 
and the policy network matrix.
We supplement this analysis by estimating the QAP matrix regres-
sions in the UCINET program to examine how competition and 
cooperation, along with the eff ect of community characteristics, in-
fl uence the structures of the policy network in the area of economic 
development. By comparing the estimated coeffi  cient with the sam-
pling distribution of coeffi  cients from all the permuted data sets, the 
regression results essentially indicate whether there is a signifi cant 
presence of stimulating mechanisms between the perceived competi-
tion/cooperation and network exchanges for economic development 
between pairs of local governments. For example, if a cooperative 
environment is perceived between two local jurisdictions in the 
cooperation matrix, the estimated coeffi  cient on the perceived 
cooperation reports the likelihood that an informal network for 
economic development also exists between them.
Results
Figure S2 shows the policy network structures among local govern-
ments in the Orlando metropolitan area. (Figures S2–S4 can be 
found in the online version of this article.) Each node represents 
local governments in this metropolitan area, and each link indicates 
an interaction with a corresponding actor on economic develop-
ment issues in forms of discussion, advice, and information sharing. 
It was created based on the degree centrality scores of each actor 
using Visone.7 Th is suggests that the more links (i.e., more relation-
ships) an actor has, as indicated by a higher degree centrality, the 
more central the actors’ position in the network is. Th is is indicated 
by the placement of the node in this visualization.
Among the various factors that contribute to the policy network 
structure depicted in fi gure S2, we contend that perceptions of 
whether other actors are competitors or cooperators for economic 
development are crucial. Th e next two fi gures reveal how these per-
ceptions are associated with policy networks. In other words, these 
fi gures show the extent to which the policy networks result from the 
perception toward others regarding competition and cooperation.
Figures S3 and S4 depict the relationships between perceptions 
and policy network structures among local governments through 
network visualization. A casual observation of the network struc-
ture suggests that the perceptions of competition and cooperation 
are closely related to the existence of the policy network. Clearly, 
there is strong correlation between perceptions of competition and 
policy networks, as indicated by the substantial overlap between 
the two relations, which is represented by purple lines in fi gure S3. 
Likewise, the substantial overlap between the perception of coopera-
tion and the policy network indicates that there is a strong correla-
tion  between the two relations in fi gure S4. It is also notable that 
fi gure S4 has slightly more overlapping relationships (purple lines) 
between perception and informal policy networks than fi gure S3.
Th e results of the QAP matrix correlation analyses confi rm more 
formally the relationship between the perceived competition/ 
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coeffi  cient implying that dissimilarity decreases the likelihood of 
network ties, yet it is not statistically signifi cant. On the other hand, 
population dissimilarity has a positive association with the observed 
economic development policy network. Th is might suggest that be-
cause larger city—small city, or central city—suburban city pairs are 
more likely to possess diff erent types of information and resources, 
and thus are made better off  by sharing complimentary information 
with each other (Lee, Feiock, and Park 2011). Yet the coeffi  cient 
on population dissimilarity is not statistically signifi cant, and our 
conjecture is not confi rmed.
Table 5 also reports the constraints of political institutions on the 
presence of network ties among local governments. Belonging to 
the same county is positively related to the chance that actors create 
network relationships. Th is hypothesis is supported by the QAP 
regression analysis, which suggests that political institutions provide 
both constraints and opportunities to local jurisdictions in creating 
policy network relationships. Communities that had adopted the 
same form of government also were expected to have cooperative 
relationships because appointed and elected offi  cials operating under 
the same institutional arrangements share similar functional objec-
tives and experience (Feiock 2007). Although the relationship is in 
the predicted direction, it is not statistically signifi cant.
Conclusion
We seek to understand the conditions under which local govern-
ments forge collaborative policy network ties for economic develop-
ment. Unlike extant research in public administration that focuses 
primarily on macro-level determinants such as institutional and 
environmental factors related to collaborative networks among local 
governments, this article emphasizes micro-level explanations for 
the emergence of informal networks for economic development. In 
particular, we are interested in how a community’s sense of competi-
tion and cooperation with other governments aff ects its tendency to 
create collaborative ties with these governments. Th e central hypoth-
esis that we test is that both strong perceptions of competition and 
strong perceptions of cooperation produce proactive approaches to 
collaborate on economic development issues. Th is suggests that local 
governments are willing to forge relationships not only with their 
cooperative partners, but also with existing competitors. However, 
the intensity of perceived cooperation and participation in informal 
networks for economic development.
Th erefore, the results of the QAP matrix correlation analyses gener-
ally support the association between perceived competition/coop-
eration and informal policy networks for economic development. 
Although perceived cooperation appears to be a stronger factor, all 
measures of this tendency turn out to be statistically signifi cant.
Next, we estimate the QAP matrix regression analysis to examine 
whether there is a tendency for competitive/cooperative perceptions 
to be positively associated with the structures of development policy 
networks.10 Here, we employ three models, from a simpler model to 
a more extended model: model 1 includes only perceived competi-
tion and cooperation as independent variables. Similarly, model 2 
examines the impact of perceived competition and cooperation, 
controlling for geographic proximity of network ties among local 
jurisdictions. Finally, model 3 investigates how two diff erent percep-
tions, along with the eff ect of similarity or dissimilarity in commu-
nity characteristics, are related to the structures of policy networks 
in the area of economic development.
Model fi ts (R2) for each model are signifi cant at the 0.001 level.11 
Th e coeffi  cient for the cooperative perception in model 1 is positive 
and statistically signifi cant (0.552). Th is result holds even after 
controlling for geographic proximity (model 2) and similarities in 
other community attribute variables (model 3). Th e positive coef-
fi cient for the perceived cooperation variable implies that there is a 
tendency to reinforce network ties among actors when they recog-
nize others as cooperative partners. On the other hand, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the probability of establishing informal ties 
is infl uenced by the offi  cials’ perception of their economic develop-
ment strategies as being competitive. Although the coeffi  cient for 
the competitive perception is in the predicted direction (0.021), it 
is not statistically signifi cant. Th is result also holds throughout the 
models tested in this analysis.12 Th e results on two key independent 
variables in this QAP matrix regression analysis might confi rm our 
fi ndings from the QAP matrix correlation analysis that perceived 
cooperation appears to be a much stronger factor. In other words, 
the fact that the Goodman-Kruskal gamma (0.689) is smaller than 
simple matching coeffi  cients (0.724), which suggests that although 
perceived competition might be closely related to the presence of 
network contacts, the marginal impact of perceived competition 
from local government becomes minimal as perceived competition 
becomes intense, especially when the impact of perceived competi-
tion and cooperation are considered together. Th erefore, cooperative 
perception appears to be a more strongly reinforcing mechanism to 
forge network relationships among  potential partners.
In addition, some community attributes were found to be impor-
tant in model 3. In particular, geographic proximity and similar-
ity in median income are positively associated with network ties. 
Community median income similarity is likely to result in more 
links with others because similarity among jurisdictions in their 
income levels refl ects similar economic agendas and policy prefer-
ences, which leads to a higher possibility of being potential partners. 
Th is particular result supports the homophily argument in the social 
network literature that similarity (homogeneity) breeds collabora-
tion (Lubell 2007). In addition, race dissimilarity has a negative 
Table 5 QAP Multiple Regression Results
Variables Model I Model II Model III
Perceived competition 0.021 0.021 0.013
Perceived cooperation 0.552*** 0.508*** 0.458***
Geographic proximity 0.190*** 0.067
Population dissimilarity 0.036
Median income dissimilarity –0.112*
Race dissimilarity –0.009
Same form of government 0.085
Same county 0.254***
Intercept 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 0.313*** 0.348*** 0.420***
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.346 0.416
Number of observations 930 930 930
Number of permutations 2500 2500 2500
Notes: The dependent variable in this analysis is informal policy networks for 
economic development; numbers in each variable represent standardized coeffi -
cients; QAP regression in UCINET output does not report standard errors on each 
variable but provides p-values. 
Signifi cance: * p ≤ .01; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .001.
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Th is article also has some limitations. First, reliance on survey data 
from one time point limits our ability to draw conclusions about 
the causality of the relationship between perceptions and infor-
mal networks for economic development. Our data on perceived 
cooperation/competition and informal networks all come from the 
same time period and the same survey. While the results of the QAP 
regression analysis suggest that cooperative and/or competitive mo-
tivation leads to the creation of informal networks with other local 
jurisdiction, it is also plausible that cooperative and/or competitive 
perceptions of existing policies are the results of informal network 
activities. Th us, we suggest that future studies should investigate 
the evolution of networks or the coevolution of networks with 
perceptions based on longitudinal data that can further advance the 
understanding of the emergence of collaborative networks.
Second, although perceived cooperation appears to be a stronger 
factor than perceived competition in the emergence of informal 
networks from our analyses, we still do not have a systematic under-
standing about the relationships among competition, cooperative 
perceptions, and informal networks for economic development. 
Why is the competitive perception positively and signifi cantly re-
lated to the cooperative perceptions? (see note 12). And why, despite 
this positive relationship, does the infl uence of competitive motiva-
tion on informal networks weaken when it is considered together 
with perceived cooperation?
In a more empirical sense, two explanations need to be mentioned. 
First, it is possible that respondents might exaggerate their network 
activities for collaborative economic development (dependent vari-
ables). Although local jurisdictions may experience much greater 
competitive pressure, they might understate their desire to become 
a winner when destructive competition is unavoidable, or they 
might overstate their valuation on collaboration, especially when 
collaborative strategies are perceived as desirable among peer actors. 
Second, and conversely, it is also possible that respondents might 
exaggerate the extent to which localities directly compete with each 
other. In fact, local governments could exert themselves along dif-
ferent development tracks (Johnson and Nieman 2004). Th erefore, 
localities might, in fact, not be engaged in as much competition with 
other jurisdictions as often assumed. Rather, they may proceed along 
multiple tracks, and this leads to much a greater level of interdepend-
ency for information and resource exchange (Nieman, Andranovich, 
and Fernandez 2000). Th ese possibilities provide room for explaining 
complexity among perceptions toward others and toward network 
activities. In particular, they provide room to consider the nonlinear 
relationship between competition and network 
activity and the interaction between competi-
tive and cooperative motivations. In this sense, 
our investigation of the interplay between 
competitive and cooperative perceptions on 
collaboration defi nes an agenda for future 
work by identifying the key micro-level proc-
esses that are involved. In this article, we found 
that cooperative perception has more of a di-
rect impact on the emergence of network ties. 
An examination of how competitive motiva-
tion mediates this relationship may be the next 
step in better understanding policy networks 
as a metropolitan governance mechanism.
the underlying mechanisms for creating a linkage may be diff erent. 
Although mechanisms based on cooperative motivation are much 
studied, competitively motivated mechanisms are intriguing and less 
well understood.
Local governments are especially likely to perceive themselves in 
competition with one another in polycentric metropolitan areas 
(Johnson and Nieman 2004; McGinnis 1999; Ostrom, Tiebout, 
and Warren 1961). However, this does not necessarily mean that 
competitive perception always leads to destructive zero-sum envi-
ronments. Rather, higher levels of individual eff ort might refl ect 
a situation in which communities share information about best 
practices in developing regional and local economies (Johnson and 
Nieman 2004). By applying these strategies, local governments 
gain valuable information, learn about best practices, and, in some 
instances, identify opportunities to formally collaborate with one 
another.
Both QAP correlation and regression analyses reveal several key 
issues: (1) perceived cooperation is positively and signifi cantly as-
sociated with informal networks for economic development, and 
(2) perceived competition on its own seems to be positively related 
to informal networks. However, when considered together with 
perceived cooperation, the infl uence of competitive motivation 
weakens. Th is implies that although perceived competition might be 
constructively related to the emergence of network ties, the mar-
ginal impact of perceived competition from the local government 
becomes weak as perceived competition becomes intense, especially 
when the impact of perceived competition and cooperation are 
considered together.
An empirical analysis reveals that similar jurisdictions, especially in 
terms of geographic location and economic status, tend to establish 
informal networks for economic development, which generally 
supports the theory of homophily. In addition, political institutions 
prove to be both constraints on and opportunities for local jurisdic-
tion in creating informal networks for economic development.
Discussion
Th e fi ndings in this article suggest that even micro-level analy-
sis on interlocal policy networks supports the lessons from the 
literature on collaboration among local governments. As the 
empirical analysis in this article indicates and as many eminent 
scholars have suggested (Agranoff  and McGuire 2003; Kettl 1996; 
Milward 1996; O’Toole 1997), collaborative policy and manage-
ment networks have become the dominant 
approach to overcoming the limited resource 
endowments, and they provide a mechanism 
that may help multiple players cohere into a 
workable structure to implement programs, 
such as trust and the perception of a common 
purpose (Agranoff  and McGuire 2003). In 
particular, this article suggests that the micro-
level predispositions of a local government 
toward competition and cooperation with 
others are signifi cant determinants of collabo-
rative activities and, in fact, can be a building 
block of any interlocal or interorganizational 
network studies.
[T]his article suggests that the 
micro-level predispositions 
of a local government toward 
competition and cooperation 
with others are signifi cant 
determinants of collaborative 
activities and, in fact, can be a 
building block of any interlocal 
or interorganizational network 
studies.
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10. In this QAP analysis, some of independent variables are highly correlated with 
one another, such as competition, cooperation, geographic proximity, and so 
on, which leads to a greater likelihood of multicollinearity problems in regular 
regression context. By choosing Dekker’s semipartialling methods in UCINET, 
MRQAP analysis provides robust tests for multicollinearity (Dekker, Krackhardt, 
and Snijders 2003).
11. Th e R2 value in model 1 is modest and low (0.313) but signifi cant at the 
0.001 level. In fact, considering the fact that (1) model 1 includes only two 
key independent variables (competitive and cooperative perceptions), and (2) 
even a more extended model does not improve the R2 value (0.313 to 0.419) 
substantially, its R2 value is moderate and suggests that the perceptions of local 
government offi  cials toward their neighboring jurisdictions (i.e., competitiveness 
and cooperativeness) matter in explaining the tendency to form informal ties.
12. Th is particular fi nding is attributed to the fact that competition and coopera-
tion are highly correlated, while cooperation is associated more strongly with 
the presence of policy network. We also run QAP matrix correlation analysis 
between competition and cooperation matrices to examine how strongly they 
are related. Th eir Pearson correlation, simple matching, Jaccard coeffi  cient, and 
Goodman-Kruskal gamma are 0.348, 0.779, 0.429, and 0.888, respectively. All 
QAP correlation coeffi  cients are signifi cant at the 0.001 level except Pearson cor-
relation. Pearson correlation is found to be signifi cant at the 0.05 level (p-value 
is 0.019). Th is consistently suggests that competition and cooperation are highly 
correlated while each factor infl uences the presence of policy networks.
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Notes
 1. Th e problem with applying the traditional regression approach to social network 
data is that standard error from regression analysis is misleading. Th is is because 
the error terms in the regression are correlated across observations. For example, 
in our data, a certain jurisdiction has a tendency to give consistently low 
informal network ratings, so it makes this jurisdiction’s residuals become low as 
well. In other words, observations in the same row or column will be positively 
correlated, and this makes the standard errors too small and the p-values too 
optimistic (Simpson 2001).
 2. Th e survey asked, “to what extent do development policies of your government 
refl ect competition with each of the government listed below?” Th is measure 
ranges from 0 (not at all) to 4 (great extent) in terms of engagement in competi-
tion.
 3. Th e survey asked, “to what extent do development policies of your government 
refl ect cooperation with each of the government listed below?” Th is measure 
ranges from 0 (not at all) to 4 (great extent) in terms of engagement in coopera-
tion.
 4. Th e specifi c questions were designed to measure the intensity of network links 
among jurisdictions ranging from 0 to 5 (0 = no interaction, 1 = annual interac-
tion, and 5 = daily interaction).
 5. It is notable that our dependent variable (network contacts) cannot be treated as 
an interval variable because the network frequencies from our survey instruments 
are not equally spaced. We collapsed this variable into a dichotomous variable 
(coded 1 for annual or more frequent interaction and 0 otherwise) because we 
believe that, conceptually, this cut point captures the greatest interval theoreti-
cally as well as empirically.
 6. What the QAP essentially does is “scramble” the dependent variable matrix 
through a large number of trials of permutations. By taking the data and scram-
bling it repeatedly, resulting in multiple random data sets with the dependent 
variable, multiple analyses can be performed (Simpson 2001).
 7. Th e Visone software is a tool that facilitates the visual exploration of social 
networks by integrating analysis and visualization of social networks data (see 
http://visone.info/).
 8. Th e Pearson measure is a reasonable measure when both matrices for compari-
son have valued relations. Th e Jaccard coeffi  cient is considered to be a standard 
measure when dealing with binary relations for both matrices. Finally, Hamming 
distance is a measure of dissimilarity or distance between the score in one matrix 
and scores in the other matrix (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
 9. Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma statistic is a symmetrical measure for associa-
tion between variables at the ordinal level. Th is measure varies from +1 to –1, 
based on the diff erence between concordant pairs and discordant pairs. Th is 
provides more fl exibility than simple matching by allowing more variation in 
one or more variables. Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma statistic is, in essence, 
the surplus of concordant pairs over discordant pairs as a percentage of all 
pairs ignoring ties. Th is can be given a PRE (proportionate reduction in error) 
interpretation. For instance, if we ignore tied pairs and guess the ranking of 
two pairs based on knowledge of the independent (column) variable x, then 
if we are presented with the x values for two randomly selected pairs, we will 
predict that if the second x is more than the fi rst, then the rank of the second 
y value will be greater than the rank of the fi rst y value. Th erefore, if gamma is 
.689, we may interpret that knowing the independent variable (competition/
cooperation in this case) reduces our errors in predicting the rank (not value) 
of the dependent variable (network ties in this case) by 68.9 percent (Agresti 
1996).
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